Each party has the right, under the 2012 JOA, to propose changes to labour programs and budgets (Article 6.1.H), but these changes must be approved by the Works Council and, if necessary, by government approval. The agreement between the parties of the groups that hold the adjacent contracts defines the conditions under which the interterritorial reservoir is developed jointly. This generally results in a unit in which all resources and facilities are jointly held and each group`s share of production and costs is based on the agreed share in the unit, regardless of the location of the facilities. In certain circumstances, the parties enter into two separate agreements concerning: (i) the formation of the unit and the distribution of unit costs and production between the contractual groups (a “unit agreement”); and (ii) the operation of the unit tank (“unit operating agreement”). However, it is more common for trade and operational provisions to be grouped into a single agreement – a single agreement and a single operating agreement – of the UUOA. The UUOA creates a non-community joint venture between the groups and their participants. UUOAs are private contracts between interest owners and, although they are generally subject to the approval of the host government, they are not publicly available. It will be interesting to see to what extent the proposed new wording is followed in terms of the costs incurred. It is customary to deal with carry provisions under the host government contract (for example.
B in the production sharing agreement) and therefore not in the JOA. Trade agreements on stretchers generally depend on the outcome of negotiations between the host government and the oil and gas companies involved. In the post-Macondo world, the editorial board spent many hours discussing the level of responsibility that should be confirmed on the operator. On the basis of the fundamental condition of the AIPN-JOAs model, according to which the operator should not suffer any profits or losses in the performance of its operator missions, the operator`s losses and profits on common activities are generally limited to the share of its participation in the JOA. One of the main arguments for this position is that if the operator does not benefit more from the operator`s designation, he should not take any more risks because he accepts this role. This principled premise is circumvented only by the optional clause of the JOA model, which provides for increased liability of the operator in the event of “gross negligence/intentional misconduct” of the operator`s “Senior Supervisory Personals”; However, such increased liability does not expressly apply to environmental damage.